Athens , 11 January 2009

Mr. Delavekouras: Good morning and happy new year. I would like to welcome you to Seferis Hall for the first briefing of the year and a presentation of the basic axes of Greek foreign policy by the Foreign Ministry’s political leadership.

Mr. Droutsas: Thank you very much. I, too, would like to welcome you and express my wishes for a happy new year for everyone, with health, success and good collaboration.

This is a good opportunity for an initial discussion of what we have done over the past three months – the first 100 days of the new government – in a brief overview. But also for a short presentation of the axes of our foreign policy – what we are planning for this year.

I remind you that the goal and commitment of the new government is for Greece to once again take the position it deserves on the international stage. To put an end to the inertia of the past and to create opportunities for our country. To protect our interests and our sovereign rights, and to make our homeland stronger. To broaden the horizons of our foreign policy, to strengthen our relations with our allies and to develop new, mutually beneficial relations where there is currently a void.

The Greek people entrusted the governance of the country to PASOK on 4 October, at what we all know was a difficult point in time, with all of the major foreign policy issues open and active. And, unfortunately, they were active – you will allow me to observe – in a less than favourable context.

Remember that just 10 days after the elections – on 14 October – the European Commission issued its progress reports on Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. These reports were a poor point of departure for our interests. They contained positions and recommendations that created a false pictures and contained views that I would call dangerous, like that on bilateral disputes that should not impact the accession courses of candidate countries.

In this environment, we began to work ahead of the December Council, and I believe that fast and decisive moves were made immediately, during our first weeks in office. Moves that set the tone of the foreign policy that the government will exercise, sending the necessary messages to our neighbours and partners. In short, the inert and timid Greece of the Karamanlis government is a thing of the past.

As you know, we developed an initial important initiative of our foreign policy: “Agenda 2014” for the Balkans. Greece is once again taking up its leading role in the Balkans. Two days after taking office, the Prime Minister himself participated in a Meeting of SEECP Foreign Ministers, introducing this ambitious plan of ours – Agenda 2014 – to the Foreign Ministers of all the Balkan countries.

The first step we wanted to take with this initiative, this proposal, was to consolidate this political proposal on the international stage. To present this proposal to our neighbours in the Balkans. To ask for and pursue international support for our proposal. That is why – you will remember – I toured the Western Balkans. We visited our neighbouring countries in the Western Balkans and at the same time we briefed our partners on this issue – our proposal, Agenda 2014 – at the first Council of EU Foreign Ministers.

That was the first step we wanted to take, as I said: to firm up this proposal in everyone’s mind and to develop this proposal and get international support for it. Specific steps in this direction will follow in the coming weeks and months.

With regard to the issue of the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, here, too, we are adopting a foreign policy of initiatives, without a defensive stance, with aggressive diplomacy, which we showed immediately with the Prime Minister’s meetings with Mr. Gruevski – meetings that took place on our intiative.

In this way, we wanted to show the whole world that Greece is coming to the negotiations on this issue with an open mind and constructive stance – but also with a crystal clear position, our national red line: a name with a geographical qualifier for use in all instances, “erga omnes”. In the European Union’s December Conclusions, we put things back into their real perspective, despite the efforts of the Swedish Presidency and certain member states. We made it clear that a solution on the name issue is a precondition for the opening of accession negotiations, but in the Conclusions of the December Council we also tried to send a positive message to the Skopje side: that a solution is feasible if there is clear political will.

I will not hide the fact that Mr. Gruevski’s initial reactions do not inspire optimism – his recent statements are well known. But we will persist in this direction. We will once again take initiatives so that within the framework of the negotiations at the UN we can reach the solution that we want on this issue.

With regard to our relations with Turkey, here, too, Greece took an immediate initiative on the level of the Prime Minister himself, with his meeting in Istanbul with Mr. Erdogan. It was an opportunity for the Greek Prime Minister to send the message that we also want to send to the Turkish people: that Greece wants friendly relations, peaceful relations, relations of a common future of development and cooperation within the framework of the European family. But at the same time, we made it clear that a precondition for this is Turkey’s full respect for international law, good neighbourly relations, full respect for Greece’s territorial integrity and sovereign rights. We consider these to be self-evident prerequisites.

Greece supports Turkey’s accession course. We support Turkey’s full accession to the European Union, but – and we stress this at every opportunity – without blank cheques. And not the Turkey of the past or the Turkey we often see in the present, but the Turkey of the future – European Turkey.

A Turkey that will adopt and fully comply with the European acquis. This is to the benefit of Turkey, of Greece and of Europe. But Turkey’s full compliance – as I set out above – is an express, clear and non-negotiable precondition for this.

And this is exactly what was set down in the conclusions of the December Council. The wording is strict and objective. And important additional elements were set down for the first time, including the reference to respect for the Law of the Sea. This is very important for Greece.

On the Cyprus issue, as well, Greece also took an immediate initiative. We stressed – and we stress at every opportunity – that Greece is once again at Cyprus’s side, standing by the Cypriot people, not in words, but in deeds.

The Greek Prime Minister’s first official visit was to Nicosia. We expressed – and we express, daily – the Greek government’s full support for President Dimitris Christofias and the Cypriot government. And I reiterate once again – because we have the developments we are all aware of in Cyprus – our full confidence in and support for the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Dimitris Christofias, and his handling of matters.

Greece is once again at Cyprus’s side, standing by the Cypriot people, in close cooperation and full coordination. With a single voice. And we showed this – in action – both during the preparations for the December Council and at the December Council, in the negotiations: that Cyprus and Greece have a single voice.

We will continue this cooperation – this full coordination – in view of the developments in Cyprus and in every sector in which Greece and Cyprus can collaborate. I remind you that both Greece and Cyprus are members of the European Union, so there is great scope for close cooperation and coordination between the two countries and the two governments.

Beyond these issues, allow me to remind you that Greece held the Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2009. I think we brought the Greek Chairmanship to a very successful conclusion. This is reflected in the comments of all of the OSCE participating states and the congratulations we received on our Chairmanship. Allow me to take this opportunity to thank – once again – all of the Foreign Ministry’s personnel for the marvellous work everyone did to make the Chairmanship a success.

It was not an easy Chairmanship, and I think the results are truly exceptional. For the first time, after 7 years, a Political Declaration was adopted at the Ministerial Meeting here in Athens; a Declaration in which the participating states express their support for the “Corfu Process”. And I think this is the Greek Chairmanship’s bequest to the OSCE.

In this way, Greece was and will be directly involved in the dialogue on the shaping of a new security architecture. And I think that the 2009 Greek Chairmanship succeeded in a way in reinvigorating the OSCE. We will maintain our role and say as a member of the OSCE Troika in the coming year, and we will continue to be an active member of the Organization. We want to capitalize further on all of the contacts and know-how gained in regions like the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Through its OSCE Chairmanship, Greece showed what it can do when there is the requisite will and systematic work. Greece showed its capabilities to the whole world last year. It showed the world its added value.

In short, up until December we tried – successfully, I think – to put things in their proper place. The void created in recent years was large – it is still large – and there are many changes we have to make in the way we exercise foreign policy. And to achieve the goals we have set, we must first change our structures and the way we work.

This brings me to the next issue that I want to touch on briefly regarding our planning for 2010: the organization of the Foreign Ministry. When you want to exercise a modern foreign policy, it is very important to look at organizational issues objectively.

We have an excellent pool of human resources at the Foreign Ministry, and I do not hesitate to admit this, based on my past experience and that of these last three months.

It is often the case that the means at the disposal of Greek diplomats do not bear comparison with the means at the disposal of many other countries. That is why we have to take another look at our approach. To see what we have and how we can use what we have and capitalize on it even more effectively. To make better use of it.

And this is where our thoughts come in regarding modernization of the Foreign Ministry. More effective use of the electronic means that we have today. I have convened a working group on this issue – under the guidance and leadership of the Foreign Ministry’s Secretary General – to carry out an objective study of the Ministry’s existing structure, our Missions abroad and operations, so that we can draw some useful conclusions and see how we can make some improvements. The modernization of the Foreign Ministry is very important to me and is a personal commitment. I have said in Parliament that I want us to move ahead with things in 2010.

The second matter is the ongoing training of all Foreign Ministry personnel. The Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy will play the role that it was designed to play. Furthermore, the opening of channels to the scientific community and think-tanks – in Greece and abroad – is an area where we can work even more effectively, drawing new ideas from the resulting dialogue.

One last issue that has to do with the organization of the Foreign Ministry is the integration of the Foreign Ministry’s press offices, in an effort not only to save on expenditure, but also to strengthen the country’s image abroad. For there to be one strategic plan for communication policy and public diplomacy. This is an area where we can do a lot of things in the immediate future.

When we talk about a modern foreign policy, we have to look a little beyond our national issues – which are, of course, the main focus of our work and efforts. But a modern foreign policy needs to address other issues, putting some emphasis on – for example – economic and energy diplomacy.

The Greek Foreign Ministry stands by the Greek enterprise, helping to create opportunities, supporting initiatives of the Greek business world abroad. Better use of the Economic and Trade Affairs Offices and much more effective collaboration with all the co-competent ministries.

I think Mr. Kouvelis will give us more details on this in a few minutes.

The second issue on which Greece has a comparative advantage – and which we have to strengthen further and capitalize on more effectively – is Cultural Diplomacy. On this, there will be close cooperation and coordination with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. So, strengthening of Cultural Diplomacy and promotion of the Greek tourism product. Greek diplomacy – our foreign policy – can play a role in this as well.

Regarding Cultural Diplomacy, I would like to refer to just one specific example. 2010 is the 2500^th anniversary of the Battle of Marathon, an historic event that can be capitalized on. Soon we will be presenting specific proposals, thoughts and activities, in collaboration with the Ministry of Culture.

A third area that needs to be further enhanced is utilization of Development Diplomacy, a turn towards Green Diplomacy. Green environmental diplomacy. Here, too, Mr. Kouvelis will have more details for you.

One last issue, which I would like to call “Greece’s opening to the world”, is the development of relations with emerging powers. The creation of the requisite institutional framework for political cooperation with countries such as India, Brazil, South Africa. And there will be visits to some of these countries soon.

Also, deepening of relations with China, strengthening of relations with allies such as the U.S., as well as traditional friends, like Russia. Securing of the role Greece can and should play in the Middle East region. Strengthening, once again, of traditional ties of friendship with the Arab world, as well as of relations with Israel. And for that reason, I will soon tour the region. That is among our immediate priorities. There will be – and Mr. Kouvelis will tell you this, I think – in the coming weeks, some activities on his part in this region.

We have to invest once again in multilateral diplomacy. Greece must once again have a discrete voice in international relations. Greece bases itself on international law and universal values. That is the cornerstone of our foreign policy and we are absolute on this point. We consider these values to be non-negotiable.

What we contribute is vital to Greece’s gaining a voice again. It is also the added value of our international presence. This means that Greece will have to be more active, once again, within the framework of the UN, with active diplomacy on all the issues being faced by humanity, including human rights, migration, climate change and development. These challenges are interrelated and call for joint solutions. Greece both wants and needs to once again be an active member of this international community.

Greece has and will continue to have substantial participation in peacekeeping operations – always based on the resolutions of the Security Council and within the framework of international legality, and bearing in mind the increasing obligations and defence needs of our country.

The same holds for Greece’s active participation in the shaping of NATO’s new Strategic Concept. This process is important and critical to our national security. And, as I said, we also want to maintain our special role in the OSCE.

Finally, our country is taking up the Chairmanship of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) from 1 June to 31 December 2010.

The emphasis is on regional cooperation and the strengthening of other structures, including the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP), and the coordination by Greece of the countries of the Balkans and the Mediterranean on environmental issues.

So we have a lot of work ahead of us and we are only at the outset of Greece’s gaining the foreign policy it deserves. We have to take bold steps ahead to full modernization of the Foreign Ministry. And we will do this.

Let’s not forget that today Greece is on the Europe’s external border, but it may – and this is what we want – become a bridge again. It can become the point that links. It can become Europe’s voice in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. But at the same time it can also become the voice of these regions within the Union. This is what we want. What is needed is vision, a plan and will. And we have all of these.

We will win this wager, because we want Greece to take the place it deserves once again.

Mr. Kouvelis: I would like to say a few things as well, and first of all I express my wishes for 2010 – a good year, with health, and a year that will be easier and more productive than last year.

I will be quite brief regarding the issues I have handled over these past months. In any case, Dimitris gave a detailed and substantial presentation of all of the Ministry’s fields of activity.

I will start by saying two things. First, regarding development cooperation, Hellenic Aid – that is, Greece’s support for development programmes carried out in countries that are in need.

Let me remind you here that it is not up to Greece alone as to whether or not it will provide development aid to certain countries. It is an obligation, given that Greece is one of the countries in the OECD’s DAC programme, and in fact, as the situation stands, we should be providing a lot more funding than we are at this time.

Naturally, in circumstances like those of today, when the country’s economy cannot bear a larger contribution, what we are trying to do is to increase the impact – the efficiency – of the development assistance we provide. And that is precisely what we are doing.

During the first two months following the elections, we couldn’t change the overall planning that was handed on to us by the previous government. But we could increase the effectiveness of the development assistance provide by the Greek tax payer.

And here I want to inform you that – in excellent cooperation with the Hellenic Aid Services – what we did was to stop the course that existed, wherein each application that came in was assessed on its own as to whether we wanted to fund it or not. And we changed the way planning was carried out, from the point where we took on responsibility through to the end of the year, so that we could have an overall picture of what we are funding and the results we are getting. That was the first thing.

The second is that in order for us to increase the effectiveness of this funding, we said that it would not suffice for Greece – which doesn’t have a lot of resources – simply to send money, but that we have to increase the added value of this funding with the participation of personnel, with the participation of Greek know-how, with the participation of Greek volunteers in programmes funded by development aid and humanitarian aid.

And that is the planning we have begun to carry out for the next four or five years, I would say, for Hellenic Aid programmes. That is, to draw up a strategic plan that looks – both geographically and thematically – at where we want our development aid to go, with emphasis on the areas of green development – renewable energy sources, water resource management, waste management in developing countries. And this allows us to export Greek know-how, “planting the seed” of Greece’s presence in these countries.

All the countries involved in development cooperation do this. They do it with very large budgets. For example, Finland budgets €2 billion. And Greece, with the limited means at its disposal, has chosen to do precisely this, but targeting specific countries and fields. We don’t want to diffuse this effort.

Included in this will be the planning for the new call for proposals and interest from NGOs that Hellenic Aid will issue. And again the goal is not simply to fund projects, but for the participation of NGOs to be added value given by Organizations that already exist and operate, while filtering very carefully, of course, who can really offer something, and not just for any logo or name to be funded if it can’t contribute to the development work we want to do. That’s it on development cooperation.

The second, and perhaps most important, is economic cooperation, economic diplomacy, and I think that the most basic thing – which we agreed on from the outset – is that we have to make this work carried out by the Foreign Ministry into an important pillar of our foreign policy. And that is what we tried to do, essentially starting by looking at economic diplomacy on the geographical and thematic levels – where Greece really can do and gain a lot.

Our geographical priorities – in the main – are aimed at Greece’s immediate neighbourhood: the Black Sea countries, the Balkans – particularly within the framework of “Agenda 2014” – and the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean. This, of course, does not rule out the traditional, major cooperation that we have with our major partners: the European Union, the U.S., Russia.

We have the countries with which we want to increase our economic cooperation: India, Brazil, South Africa, China. There is and will continue to be a lot of activity aimed at developing our relations with these countries. But there is also an approach to countries that we had forgotten about a little bit. That is, the Arab countries and countries of the Middle East, Japan – with whom we have in a sense lost the thread of our cooperation, and we want to increase this economic cooperation – and Asian and Latin American countries overall.

One of the goals we have set with the competent Services is for us to be able – by geographical area and thematic field – to set down and map out what it is we are trying to achieve through economic cooperation. Economic cooperation is not just sending business missions and catching what you catch, because this brings poor and ephemeral results.

What we have planned to do is to be able to map out – in collaboration with our Embassies and Commercial Offices – what comparative advantage Greece can pursue and promote in each country, because – simply put – they won’t go to Spain to sell olive oil, and they won’t go to Denmark to sell renewable energy. There is no market there for us.

But it would be good for us to know, for example, that in the Black Sea countries there is great potential for promoting our agricultural products – that has to be set down and targeted so that we know what we want to achieve there. And this makes our business missions much more productive, because this is what businesspeople want.

I should mention here that we plan very soon to have contacts and collaboration with the country’s Chambers of Commerce so that we can know what enterprises are trying to pursue in their economic policy abroad on issues that interest us very much and that are priorities and are included in the government’s programme: energy and renewable energy sources, tourism, promotions of agricultural products. Aimed at a triptych that says that we want to increase our country’s exports – which I must tell you have fallen consistently over the past 3-4 years – and the balance of trade has fallen consistently; that is, we have more imports and less exports. So we want to increase the country’s exports, promote cooperation and exchange of know-how, while also being able to attract investment in Greece.

Some very important cooperation has been achieved in these first two months. On our visit to Azerbaijan, we discussed energy issues – use, that is, of energy resources; mainly natural gas from Azerbaijan – as well as the promotion of Greek know-how and technology, mainly in the sector of renewable energy sources in Azerbaijan. And there was, in fact, a follow-up from both sides; from the center for renewable energy sources and private companies who are already – following our visit – pursuing potentially major contracts in Azerbaijan. At a time of economic crisis, this is very important for the country’s construction and manufacturing sectors.

Second, we had bilateral cooperation with Russia, with the Deputy Foreign Minister and the Transport Minister – my co-chair on the JICs, where we had important successes: the agreement that Greece be one of the countries that will utilize the know-how it has in Russia’s preparations for the Sochi Olympics in 2014, bidding for projects and roles and designs and construction and logistics. That is why there will be a visit to Moscow and a JIC there, including a visit to Sochi, in May or June 2010. And of course we are continuing this planning with our next moves, which are, in early March, the JIC with the U.S. – the ECCC – on a large range of economic cooperation issues. There will also be many JICs with countries of the Black Sea, ahead of our BSEC Chairmanship. This is a region that interests us greatly and an emerging and energy and economic force.

Let me also say that there are a lot of opportunities that we are trying to capitalize on as much as we can. For example, the recent visit to the Czech Republic with President Papoulias, in which we participated, and during which we had many bilateral meetings on economic issues. And, of course, next week, the President of the Republic’s visit to Abu Dhabi for the inauguration of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), which we will belong to – I and Deputy Energy Minister Maniatis will participate, precisely so that we can pursue and enter into new synergies.

There will also be a visit to other countries of the region that are of energy or economic importance. Personally, I will visit Qatar and Kuwait to promote cooperation – general economic cooperation as well as energy cooperation in particular – and to sign a series of Cooperation Agreements that have already been prepared.

That brings me to the third issue that is very relevant to all this, which is Green Diplomacy. As you know, Green Diplomacy is a matter that the Prime Minister himself considers to be of great importance, and he showed this with the initiative he took for the meeting in Prespes with the FYROM and Albanian sides, and we are following this up through collaboration with the Environment Ministry. In our assessment, a Cooperation Agreement could be signed as early as February, on the level of Environment Ministers, concerning management of and cooperation on the Prespes Park.

But that is only one part, because we are trying to initiate cooperation of this kind with other neighbouring countries in our wider region, following the Copenhagen Conference. The Copenhagen Conference may not have produced the result we wanted, but it was a springboard, if you like, for Greece to be able to try to play a regional role in what happens from here on in.

We are starting with the implementation of this commitment we have made: to play this regional role. What does this mean? That on a regional level – the Black Sea, the Balkans and the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean – we will move ahead on cooperation with our neighbouring countries so that we can plan and set regional goals for confronting and adapting to climate change. So that we can move ahead with research and applied research programmes, and regarding this let me inform you that we have already had a meeting with the competent EU directorate so that we can secure funding for such programmes and pilot projects.

Finally – so as not to hold the floor for too long and so we have time for Q&A – let me tell you that an issue that has to do with all this is that we are coordinating and collaborating with the co-competent Ministries. Mr. Droutsas already mentioned the Culture Ministry. Let me add that we have already had two or three meetings with the Energy, Environment and Climate Change Ministry on energy planning, both on a geopolitical level and as to planning the energy mix, so that we know how and what we are pursuing; so that we can go in with targets on agriculture issues, the promotion of agricultural products and, naturally, tourism.

Finally, I will close by mentioning issues of Greeks abroad and the Greek Diaspora. Here, as you know, we are trying to maintain constant contact with Diaspora Hellenism and its representatives. I have already collaborated a number of times with the President of the World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE). I participated in the meeting of the Boards of the SAE, and the meeting of the SAE youth. And what we are planning from here on in is how the conclusions of the annual SAE reports will start to be made public and dealt with in collaboration with the co-competent Ministries.

Because, as you know, Diaspora Hellenism issues are not the exclusive concern of the Foreign Ministry, but often concern co-competent Ministries on issues of education, recognition of credentials, etc. So we are gradually starting to implement all this and, mainly, to keep in contact, because – I remind you of what I have often said – what Greeks abroad want from us is to see progress and consistency in our collaboration.

And we also want to come into contact with members of the Greek Diaspora who are not yet involved in these issues. Scientists, academics, politicians; people who play important roles in countries around the world and can work with us on many levels.

Journalist: Intensification of the consultations in the negotiations on the Cyprus issue begins today. I would like your comment on Talat’s proposals regarding governance.

Mr. Droutsas: The President of the Republic of Cyprus himself, Mr. Christofias, has replied – following meetings/consultations that he has with all of the political parties in Cyprus – that these proposals from Mr. Talat cannot serve as even a basis for negotiations.

I would just like to add that there is some disappointment. We see that these proposals from the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish side are not moving in a direction that might guarantee constructive negotiations.

I think that these proposals – and the spirit of these proposals – are a step backwards, and that is a shame. We would really like to see a more constructive stance from the side of the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey on this issue.

Journalist: Mr. Minister, following Mr. Erdogan’s letter, we have been left in the dark a little with regard to the Greek government’s intentions as to the handling of bilateral issues with Turkey, like the Aegean. What is your strategy for 2010, and what might you say to Davutoglou if you see him at the end of the week?

Mr. Droutsas: First of all, let me say that a meeting with Mr. Davutoglou at the end of the week is not provided for in my programme. But let me stress that it is our will that a meeting take place with the Turkish side – for me to meet with Mr. Davutoglou at the first opportunity and soon.

I see that you are referring to the fact that the end of the week will see the inauguration of Istanbul as the Cultural Capital for 2010. This event would certainly be a good opportunity for a meeting with Mr. Davutoglou, but at this particular moment in time, my priority is the visit of the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Christofias, to Athens.

But let me stress that we want to discuss things with the Turkish side – discussion is necessary. We have expressed our will to work together. And we have said what we see as the preconditions that would ensure constructive cooperation with Turkey on many levels. And, as I said, we will try for an initial meeting with Mr. Davutoglou at the first appropriate opportunity and as soon as possible, as a follow-up to the meeting we had in Athens in early December, at the OSCE Ministerial.

Journalist: Mr. Minister, at the Summit Meeting in Brussels we have the following facts. Turkey is continuing its accession process, if only with the opening of just one chapter: that on the environment. Turkey refuses to implement the customs union protocol. Turkey does not recognize that there are 27 member states in the European Union; it says there are 26. Turkey continues its activities in the Aegean: overflights, violations. Turkey continues to have the casus belli in force, and I really don’t see precisely what Greek diplomacy’s success was at this Meeting.

Mr. Droutsas: Everything you mentioned points once again to the void that I mentioned in my brief opening statement with regard to foreign policy issues in recent years. With regard to our relations to Turkey as well – that there was in fact no progress on a number of issues, like the ones you mentioned.

Support for Turkey’s European course is still a useful tool for our foreign policy on Turkey and the achievement of our own goals. But only as long – and this is absolutely necessary – as we use this tool and use it effectively, which is something we didn’t see in recent years.

When we began this policy in 1999, with the Helsinki decisions, I think we saw very tangible results. First of all, the first goal of this policy was achieved: the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU – a very important achievement and a very important issue. Also at that time, we set the goal of the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean, with a specific timeframe. The policy choice of the previous government did not allow us to reach this goal.

The goal of the current government is precisely, through correct, effective utilization – this is what we are attempting through the new conditions that have been created in the EU in recent years – to once again reach this goal: the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf. And if need be, for this to happen via recourse to the International Court in The Hague.

These have been the first three months of the new government’s exercising of foreign policy, and – as regards our relations with Turkey – the first goal was to put things back in their proper place.

I believe that the December Conclusions have helped in this direction. Some matters have been set down in a clear manner. We will strive in this direction with clear positions, with initiatives, with a policy of self-confidence in relations to everyone, including, of course, in the case of Turkey.

Journalist: You are trying for a clear position on things as they stand in Greek-Turkish relations with regard to Turkey, but Mr. Erdogan has also put forward his clear positions and we are still waiting for another letter. Will you tell us about that if you can? I wanted to ask more about Greek-U.S. issues.

I wanted to ask you whether you have decided to visit the U.S., because three months have gone by and we haven’t had any news, and we learn from Washington that the procedures for the visa waiver have been completed for some time now but that the ceremony isn’t being held for this reason. Does it have to do with the government’s having to decide whether the Prime Minister will go, or you, or some other delegation? And does it have anything to do with the Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow – when he will go to the U.S. – or not?

Mr. Droutsas: First of all, let me say that the Prime Minister’s reply to Mr. Erdogan will be made at the most appropriate time.

As regards the issue of the U.S., all of these issues concerning visits are a matter of discussions  and agreements. During our first two and a half months in office, we focussed on the issues that concerned us immediately in Europe, in the EU, ahead of the December Council.

Both the Prime Minister and I – you will remember – had a number of meetings with U.S. officials. There was the meeting with Ms. Clinton in Berlin. There was the meeting with Deputy Secretary Steinberg here in Athens, within the framework of the OSCE Ministerial. Constant consultations and contacts.

Now, the issue of the Prime Minister’s visit to the U.S. As you know, during the brief meeting Mr. Papandreou had with Mr. Obama in Copenhagen – within the framework of the Copenhagen Conference – the U.S. President himself invited Mr. Papandreou to visit Washington. And we are now in the midst of procedures to find the right date for both sides.

All of these visits – whether the Prime Minister’s or my own, to Washington – all of these preparations are being made now. And I think we will be able to carry them out very soon.

Journalist: Mr. Minister, I would like to ask you what we are expecting from the Spanish Presidency, and whether you have initiated the process for some meetings with this Presidency. Thank you.

Mr. Droutsas: As you know, Prime Minister Papandreou has already had an initial meeting with his Spanish counterpart, Mr. Zapatero, who visited Athens shortly before Spain took up its Presidency. This was a very good opportunity for the two Prime Ministers to exchange views and discuss all of the issues the Spanish Presidency will be called upon to handle. Issues concerning the EU as a whole, as well as issues of particular interest to Greece.

I think everyone knows how close the relations between Greece and Spain are, and how close the personal relationship is between Mr. Papandreou and Mr. Zapatero, as well as Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos.

As Mediterranean countries, Greece and Spain share many common interests. Greece’s close cooperation with the Spanish Presidency of the European Union can be considered a given. We look forward to close cooperation – with the Spanish Presidency, Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero, Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos – on issues of particular interest to Greece as well.

Journalist: Regarding Greek-Turkish issues. Apart from Mr. Papandreou’s letter to his counterpart, I would like you to tell me how Athens sees relations between Athens and Ankara progressing in the coming months. Do you see steps being made in this direction? That is, will Athens’ aggressive diplomacy continue? And specifically, does Athens intend to take steps toward the institutionalization of – the formulation of a framework for – the high-level dialogue Ankara is proposing?

Mr. Droutsas: You can consider it a given that Greece will take the necessary initiatives and will be the one to move this whole process along. As I said earlier, a meeting between myself and Mr. Davutoglou is among my priorities. It will happen soon. It will happen at the first opportunity, in the spirit we developed in Mr. Papandreou’s meeting with Mr. Erdogan, as well as our meeting with Mr. Davutoglou in early December, here in Athens.

We have expressed our sincere will for close cooperation, modelled after – you will permit me to make this reminder – the policy we exercised from 1999 to 2004. We are preparing systematically, we will effect this rapprochement in very careful steps, we are studying it, and we will identify the areas where we can develop cooperation with Turkey. This may be on some major international issues like climate change and environmental protection, which concern the whole region, and on which isolated and fragmentary moves cannot bring the desired results. This is a very good field where Greece and Turkey can jointly develop cooperation and joint initiatives for the Mediterranean region.

The cooperation will also focus on regional issues, like the Middle East, for instance, where Turkey and Greece can jointly play an important role.

Let me remind you here of a joint initiative taken by George Papandreou and Ismail Cem – then the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey, respectively – on the Middle East, with their joint visit to the Palestinian territories. They visited Yasser Arafat, and then Ariel Sharon. Initiatives of this type can be taken to show in practice that we are cooperating.

And, of course, cooperation on a bilateral level, in sectors where there are common interests. Issues that are often called “low policy” issues, but that in my opinion are equally important, because they concern the everyday lives of Greek citizens; the country’s economic growth.

Here, we will pursue cooperation on tourism and, on a bilateral level, the environment, economic cooperation. All of these issues are being looked at; we are studying them and we will take the necessary initiatives. We will take the necessary steps.

And beyond that, we will focus our attention on the issue of the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf. We will pursue this through intensification of the exploratory contacts, which have been going on for some time now. But I have the feeling that in recent years these talks have lost their momentum. We want to intensify these talks – these exploratory contacts.

I stress once again that our relations with Turkey are an immediate priority for us. We will sincerely pursue cooperation. But we have stated just as sincerely the clear prerequisite that Turkey has to show its better self now and fully respect what I mentioned earlier: international law, the rules of good neighbourly relations and Greece’s territorial integrity and sovereign rights. Just as Turkey needs to take the necessary steps as regards the resolution of the Cyprus issue.

Journalist: The Turkish Cypriot side – the pseudo-state, that is – is moving ahead with the opening of diplomatic bureaus in many countries and these bureaus will represent the pseudo-state, of course. What is your opinion of this move? Thank you.

Mr. Droutsas: The position is always clear. There is one entity that is recognized internationally, and that is the Republic of Cyprus – nothing else.